

# THE ROLE OF GLORIA IN AQUINAS' PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

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SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. 2. The Basic Meaning of Gloria in Aquinas. 2.1. Intrinsic and Extrinsic 'Gloria'. 2.2. Extrinsic Gloria in Aquinas. 3. Gloria as the End of Religious Worship. 4. Gloria as the end of the universe. 5. Conclusion.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

OF the many concepts in Aquinas' thought that possess great explicatory mileage, few have been paid as little philosophical attention in the secondary literature as that of 'glory' (*gloria*).<sup>1</sup> Given the biblical connections of this term (Grk, *doxa*; Heb., *hod*, *kabod*), philosophers have naturally steered clear of what appears to be a *bona fide* theological concept in order to avoid mixing disciplines. One may feel tempted to infer from the theological applications of

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<sup>1</sup> Apart from the traditional Thomistic commentators (e.g., Cajetan) who discuss the term philosophically within the context of the *Summa*, the term is also confidently used in early- and mid-twentieth century scholastic philosophical manuals; see, for instance, E. HUGON, *Cursus philosophiae scholasticae. Ia-IIae: Cosmologia*, 3rd Ed. Lethielleux, Paris 1927, pp. 301-302. For a recent philosophical discussion on *gloria*, and related terms such as honor and reverence, see my *The Problem of the Finality of Religion and the Standard Thomistic Account*, «Tópicos», 39 (2010), pp. 105-127; cfr. IDEM, *The Finality of Religion in Aquinas' Theory of Human Acts.*, Proquest Digital Dissertations, Ann Arbor, Michigan 2009. As a rough, but telling, indication of this concept's 'mileage' in Aquinas' texts, one may consider the fact that a search for *glori\** in the *Index Thomisticum* turned up 9,828 'cases' or instances in 3,535 'places' or passages. Compare this result with searches on other key philosophical concepts in Aquinas (in order of frequency):

- *act\** (36,545 cases; 14,665 places),
- *substanti\** (14,239 cases; 5,855 places),
- *verita\** (9,997 cases; 4,678 places),
- *acciden\** (8,375 cases; 3,898 places),
- *subjec\** (2,079 cases; 993 places),
- *pulchr\** (1,483 cases; 655 places),
- *analog\** (301 cases; 208 places).

the concept that *gloria* is originally a theological notion (and not a philosophical one), or that it belongs to the realm of Judeo-Christian theology and nowise to philosophy. Yet this is untenable. As we shall see, the basic meaning of the concept in Aquinas belongs to the realm of natural psychology. As a matter of fact, Aquinas' definition of the term can ultimately be traced back to Cicero as its source. Moreover, apart from this concept's obvious function in Aquinas' theology (e.g., in his theory of grace, in his eschatology), it has also less obvious, yet equally important, applications for Aquinas' philosophy of religion. Of these applications, perhaps the better known is the crucial role that the concept plays in Aquinas' metaphysics of creation. Aquinas' answer to the question of why God created the world is that God did not create out of necessity, but did so freely, to share His goodness and thus increase His 'glory'. A lesser known application of the concept of *gloria* within Aquinas' philosophy of religion is its role as the ultimate end of the human virtues, in particular the virtue of religion (or religious worship). As we shall see, Aquinas tells us that the acts of religious worship have, as their end, the 'glory' of God; this gives the virtue of religion precedence (*praeferenda, praeeminet*) over the other moral virtues. These last two roles of the concept of *gloria* in Aquinas – in metaphysics and ethics – are not unrelated. For Aquinas, the whole corporeal universe, including rational and irrational creatures, was created to give glory to God, and the way human beings reach this goal rationally is through the virtue of religion.

The aim of this essay is threefold: to explain the concept of *gloria* in general, Aquinas' use of it in his discussion of the virtue of religion, and the relation that this use has to Aquinas' creation metaphysics. Accordingly, I shall divide the essay into three parts that correspond to my three goals. In the opening section (2), I shall unpack the philosophical notion of *gloria* in Aquinas. There I shall also defend the distinction that developed later in the Thomistic tradition between the 'intrinsic' and the 'extrinsic' glory of God as being not only implied in Aquinas' texts, but also as being of great exegetical and philosophical value. Then (3), I shall use the notion of *gloria*, together with the related word pair, 'honor' and 'reverence', to piece together Aquinas' account of why religion is good. Finally, I shall close the paper (4) by relating Aquinas' use of *gloria* as the end of religion with the role that *gloria* plays in his creation metaphysics.

## 2. THE BASIC MEANING OF GLORIA IN AQUINAS

What exactly does Aquinas mean by the 'glory' of God? He uses the term in different senses, with reference to both God and creatures. Many of the meanings that he assigns to this term are theological insofar as they rely on Divine Revelation.<sup>2</sup> Yet, two of its meanings, which I call the intrinsic and extrinsic

<sup>2</sup> See especially Aquinas' references to the "glory" of the Beatific Vision; cf. R. DEFER-

glory of God, can be studied from a strictly philosophical point of view insofar as they do *not* presuppose revelation. I shall first make explicit the distinction between these two, so that I may subsequently focus on the extrinsic glory of God as it bears on Aquinas' philosophy of religion.

### 2. 1. *Intrinsic and Extrinsic 'Glory'*

In its first and primary philosophical meaning, *gloria* seems to refer to something in God, as an aspect of the Divine Nature itself. We observe this usage in *ST* II-II.81.7c, where Aquinas addresses the issue of why we should worship God:

«[W]e show reverence and honor to God, not on account of [God] Himself, who is in Himself full of glory (*in seipso est gloria plenus*), and to whom nothing can be added by a creature, but on account of ourselves; because, that is, through the fact that we revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him—and its perfection consists in this; for any thing is perfected through the fact that it is subjected to its superior, just as the body through the fact that it is vivified by the soul, and air through the fact that it is illumined by the Sun».<sup>3</sup>

As is clear from the words «in Himself full of glory» (*in seipso est gloria plenus*), the 'glory' of God here is something in God, an attribute of the Divine Nature and, therefore, it is identical with God Himself. Hence, Aquinas expressly tells us that, given God's supreme perfection and immutability, glory in this sense at least cannot be given or added (*adiici*) to God and therefore that this is *not* the end of showing reverence and honor to God.

Frequently within the *Summa theologiae*, however, one finds a secondary sense of divine "glory." For example, when discussing the end of religious worship, Aquinas often cites the glory of God as that which the worshipper seeks to give to God: «The end of divine worship is that man may give glory to God.»<sup>4</sup> «All things, according as they are done for God's glory, pertain to religion....»<sup>5</sup> «We do not exhibit something to God on account of his utility,

RARI, *A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 1948-49, p. 465.

<sup>3</sup> *Summa theologiae* (henceforth, *ST*) II-II.81.7c, in *Opera Omnia: iussu impensaue, Leonis XIII. P.M. edita*, Rome 1882-: «Deo reverentiam et honorem exhibemus non propter ipsum, qui in seipso est gloria plenus, cui nihil a creatura adiici potest, sed propter nos, quia videlicet per hoc quod Deum reveremur et honoramus, mens nostra ei subiicitur, et in hoc eius perfectio consistit; quaelibet enim res perficitur per hoc quod subditur suo superiori, sicut corpus per hoc quod vivificatur ab anima, et aer per hoc quod illuminatur a sole». All subsequent texts of Aquinas, unless otherwise noted, are taken from the Leonine edition. All translations from the Latin are my own.

<sup>4</sup> *ST* II-II.93.2c: «Finis autem divini cultus est ut homo Deo det gloriam [...]».

<sup>5</sup> *ST* II-II.81.4 ad 2: «Omnia, secundum quod in gloriam Dei fiunt, pertinent ad religionem».

but on account of His glory, and our utility»<sup>6</sup>. In this sense, *gloria* seems to refer to a created reality, something in creatures. It is in this sense that Aquinas claims creatures increase the glory of God. “God’s glory” in this sense, then, is neither infinite nor immutable; it can admit of degrees.

Based on these two senses of *gloria* in Aquinas’ texts, later Thomistic scholars<sup>7</sup> coined the terms *gloria intrinseca* (or *interna*) and *gloria extrinseca* (or *externa*).<sup>8</sup> Aquinas himself never used these terms; their meanings, however, are certainly found in the texts. For instance, in his *Super Psalmos*, Aquinas is conscious of the conceptual distinction between these two senses of *gloria*.

*Bring to the Lord glory to His name.* It is to be noted that the Lord wanted these things to be offered to Him, not for His own sake, for He himself has said (Psalm 49), *Shall I eat the flesh of bulls, or shall I drink the blood of goats?*, but in order that we might know that He is the origin of all our good and the end to which all is to be referred.... He then says that because God Himself is full of glory we ought on that account to glorify Him: whence He says, *Bring to the Lord glory to His name.* He is in himself full of glory (*ipse in se gloriosus est*), but His Name should be full of glory among us (*in nobis gloriosum esse*), that is, it is to become glorious in our recognition (*in notitia nostra sit gloriosum*). Moreover, in order that He might be full of glory and illustrious among us, we must give Him honor.<sup>9</sup>

The terminological distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic glory, then, though of later origin, is well founded in Aquinas’ texts. I shall rely on it in the

<sup>6</sup> ST II-II.81.6 ad 2: «Deo autem non exhibetur aliquid propter eius utilitatem, sed propter eius gloriam, nostram autem utilitatem».

<sup>7</sup> The explicit terminology of *gloria externa* vs. *gloria interna* dates back at least to the late 17<sup>th</sup> Century: cfr. P. BARBAY, *Commentarius in Aristotelis Moralem*, Gregorium Josse, Paris 1690, p. 84: «Duplex est Dei gloria: una Interna & essentialis; altera Externa & accidentalis. Gloria interna Dei est clarissima cum laude notitia, quam habent tres Personae adorandae Trinitatis de suis perfectionibus. Gloria externa Dei est clara cum laude notitia, quam habent creaturae intellectuales de Deo ejusque perfectionibus».

<sup>8</sup> The distinction between these two meanings is explicit in Cajetan (although not so with the terminology itself); cfr. *In ST II-II.81.7*, in *Opera Omnia: iussu impensaue, Leonis XIII. P.M. edita*, Rome 1882: «In nobis ergo glorificatur Deus cultu nostro, in universo extra Deum: non in seipso. Sed tamen hoc ipsum quod est extendi gloriam eius, ad ipsum ordinandum est ut finem propter quem debet fieri, et ad quod universi bona ordinantur, quia est Deus».

<sup>9</sup> *In Ps 28.3*, in *Opera omnia*, t. 14: *In psalmos Davidis expositio*, Typis Petri Fiaccadori, Parma 1863: «Afferte Domino gloriam nomini eius. Notandum quod Dominus voluit sibi offerri ista non propter se sed ut cognoscamus eum principium omnium bonorum nostrorum, et finem in quem omnia sunt referenda [...]. Dicit ergo quod ipse Deus est gloriosus, et ideo debemus sibi gloriam; unde dicit, *Afferte Domino gloriam nomini eius*. Ipse in se gloriosus est, sed nomen eius debet in nobis gloriosum esse, idest ut in notitia nostra sit gloriosum. Et quod sit ipse in nobis gloriosum esse, idest ut in notitia nostra sit gloriosum. Et quod sit ipse in nobis gloriosus et clarus, debemus ei honorem dare».

remainder of the paper to isolate and thus unpack Aquinas' understanding of God's *extrinsic* glory as the end of the virtue of religion.

## 2. 2. *Extrinsic Glory in Aquinas*

As mentioned in the introduction, Aquinas ultimately derives his understanding of the extrinsic glory of God from Cicero's definition: «glory is frequent fame with praise about someone (*gloria est frequens de aliquo fama cum laude*)».<sup>10</sup> Aquinas' version of this definition is a paraphrase by Augustine, which Aquinas erroneously attributes to Ambrose:<sup>11</sup> «splendorous recognition with praise (*clara cum laude notitia*)».<sup>12</sup> This notion in Aquinas is most explicitly developed in his discussion on vainglory in *ST II-II.132.1c*:

«Glory signifies a certain splendor (*claritatem*), hence to be glorified is the same as to be given splendor (*clarificari*), as Augustine says in *On John*. Now, splendor (*claritas*) has a certain beauty (*decorem*) and manifestation; and, therefore, the name "glory" properly imports someone's manifestation of what seems beautiful (*decorum*) before men, whether it be a bodily or a spiritual good. Since, however, that which is splendorous (*clarus*) simply can be seen by many, and by those who are far, thus, by the name "glory" one properly designates that someone's good comes to the recognition (*notitiam*), and [meets] the approval, of many [...].<sup>13</sup>

From this explanation, we gather Aquinas' interpretation of the key points of the Augustinian definition of glory: by "glory," he understands the knowledge (cfr. *notitia*) that one human being has of the goodness or beauty (cfr. *clara*) of another, and which results in an expression of that recognition (cfr. *cum laude*).

Now, we may learn more about the notion of extrinsic glory in Aquinas if we attend to his explanation of the relationship between glory and the conceptual pair of honor and reverence. As Aquinas explains, honor is the exterior testimony or witnessing of someone's excellence: «Honor conveys a certain testimony of someone's excellence. Hence, men who wish to be hon-

<sup>10</sup> CICERO, *De inventione rhetorica*, 2.55, in *Opera omnia quae exstant critico apparatus instructa*, Mondadori, Milano 1990. Cfr. *Summa contra gentiles* 3.29.

<sup>11</sup> As we shall see below, in *ST II-II.103.1 ad 3* Aquinas erroneously attributes this definition to a *quaedam glossa Ambrosii*, and in 132.1 arg. 3 to Ambrose himself.

<sup>12</sup> AUGUSTINE, *Contra Maximinum* 2.13, in J.P. MIGNÉ (ed.), *Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina*, (henceforth, *PL*), J.P. Migne, Paris 1845, vol. 42, col. 770: «[G]loria... hoc est, clara cum laude notitia».

<sup>13</sup> *ST II-II.132.1c*: «[G]loria claritatem quandam significat, unde glorificari idem est quod clarificari, ut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan. Claritas autem et decorem quendam habet, et manifestationem. Et ideo nomen gloriae proprie importat manifestationem alicuius de hoc quod apud homines decorum videtur, sive illud sit bonum aliquod corporale, sive spirituale. Quia vero illud quod simpliciter clarum est, a multis conspici potest et a remotis, ideo proprie per nomen gloriae designatur quod bonum alicuius deveniat in multorum notitiam et approbationem [...].»

ored seek a witnessing to their excellence, according to the Philosopher in the first and eighth [books] of the *Ethics*»<sup>14</sup>. Thus, excellence is the motive for honor; honor is the effect of excellence. Yet, this is not the full story: there is something intermediary between excellence and honor. Honor is the external manifestation of an interior response to excellence. This interior response is 'reverence'. Thus, excellence inspires an interior reverence. This reverence, in turn, is expressed outwardly in the form of honor. Hence, honor is the exterior manifestation or showing of one's interior reverence towards someone excellent: «for honor is reverence exhibited to someone on account of their excellence»<sup>15</sup>. Thus, it is evident how the two concepts are related: honor is the exterior counterpart of interior reverence:

«Reverence is not the same as honor: but on the one hand it is the primary motive for showing honor, insofar as one man honors another out of the reverence he has for him; and on the other hand, it is the end of honor, insofar as a person is honored in order that he may be held in reverence by others».<sup>16</sup>

Further, Aquinas establishes in many places a causal relationship between honor and glory (along with praise, which, in one sense, is a verbal form of honor<sup>17</sup>):

«[G]lory is the effect of honor and praise. For, from the fact that we give testimony to someone's goodness, his goodness becomes splendidous (*clarescit*) in the recognition of many (*in notitia plurimorum*). And the word "glory" indicates this, for "glory" (*gloria*) is said like "splendor" (*claria*). Hence in *Romans* I, a certain gloss of Ambrose<sup>18</sup>

<sup>14</sup> *ST* II-II.103.1c: «[H]onor testificationem quandam importat de excellentia alicuius, unde homines qui volunt honorari, testimonium suae excellentiae quaerunt, ut per philosophum patet, in I et VIII *Ethic*». Cfr. *In I Eth* 12, lect. 18, n. 2: «Honor enim importat quoddam testimonium manifestans excellentiam alicuius, sive hoc fiat per verba sive per facta, utpote cum aliquis genuflectit alteri vel assurgit ei».

<sup>15</sup> Cfr. *ST* III.25.1c: «[N]am honor est reverentia alicui exhibita propter sui excellentiam, ut in secunda parte dictum est». Cfr. *Quodlibet* 10.6.1 arg. 3: «Ex uerbis Philosophi in I *Ethi*corum colligitur quod honor est exhibitio reverencie in testimonium uirtutis».

<sup>16</sup> *ST* II-II.103.1 ad 1: «[R]everentia non est idem quod honor, sed ex una parte est principium motivum ad honorandum, inquantum scilicet aliquis ex reverentia quam habet ad aliquem, eum honorat; ex alia vero parte est honoris finis, inquantum scilicet aliquis ad hoc honoratur ut in reverentia habeatur ab aliis».

<sup>17</sup> Cfr. *ST* II-II.103.1 ad 3: «Ad tertium dicendum quod laus distinguitur ab honore dupliciter. Uno modo, quia laus consistit in solis signis verborum, honor autem in quibuscumque exterioribus signis. Et secundum hoc, laus in honore includitur. Alio modo, quia per exhibitionem honoris testimonium reddimus de excellentia bonitatis alicuius absolute, sed per laudem testificamur de bonitate alicuius in ordine ad finem, sicut laudamus bene operantem propter finem; honor autem est etiam optimorum, quae non ordinantur ad finem, sed iam sunt in fine; ut patet per philosophum, in I *Ethic*».

<sup>18</sup> As noted above (note 12), the source of this latter definition is not Ambrose, but Augustine (*Contra Maximinum* 2.13: *PL* 42, 770).

says that glory is splendid recognition with praise (*clara cum laude notitia*).<sup>19</sup>

«[G]lory is a certain effect of honor and praise: because from the fact that someone is praised, or any reverence is paid to him, he becomes splendid (*clarus*) in the recognition (*notitia*) of others». <sup>20</sup>

«[G]lory is the effect of honor, for, due to the fact that someone is honored or praised, they become 'clarified' in the eyes of others. And, thus, just as it is the same to be honored and to be glorious, so the honest is the same as the beautiful». <sup>21</sup>

Now, honor differs from glory as an effect from a cause. For honor is reverence exhibited in testimony of excellence; hence it is a testimony of its goodness. <sup>22</sup>

Thus, the fact that someone is honored and revered causes glory in the minds of others concerning that person. If glory is the effect, then honor and reverence are the cause.

Now, Aquinas reasons that if honor and reverence are the efficient causes of glory, then glory is the final cause of honor and reverence. That is to say, glory is the end of honoring and revering someone. He writes:

«Praise and honor are compared to glory, as was said above, as the causes from which glory follows. Hence, glory is compared to them as an end, for someone loves to be honored and praised on account of the fact that, through this, someone thinks himself to be excellent (*praeclarus*) in the recognition (*notitia*) of others». <sup>23</sup>

One desires to be honored because this is a sign of one's excellence. Similarly, people are honored and revered so that they may be "glorified" in the minds of others.

<sup>19</sup> ST II-II.103.1 ad 3: «Gloria autem est effectus honoris et laudis. Quia ex hoc quod testificamur de bonitate alicuius, clarescit eius bonitas in notitia plurimorum. Et hoc importat nomen gloriae, nam gloria dicitur quasi clara. Unde Rom. I, dicit quaedam Glossa Ambrosii quod gloria est clara cum laude notitia».

<sup>20</sup> ST II-II.132.2C: «[G]loria est quidam effectus honoris et laudis, ex hoc enim quod aliquis laudatur, vel quaecumque reverentia ei exhibetur, redditur clarus in notitia aliorum».

<sup>21</sup> ST II-II.145.2 ad 2: «Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, gloria est effectus honoris, ex hoc enim quod aliquis honoratur vel laudatur, redditur clarus in oculis aliorum. Et ideo, sicut idem est honorificum et gloriosum, ita etiam idem est honestum et decorum».

<sup>22</sup> Cfr. *Super Epistolam ad Hebraeos lectura*, c. 2, lect. 2, in R. CAI (ed.), *Super Epistolas S. Pauli lectura*, 8<sup>th</sup> ed., Marietti, Turin-Rome 1953: «Differt autem honor a gloria, sicut effectus a causa. Est enim honor reverentia exhibita in testimonium excellentiae, unde est testificatio bonitatis eius».

<sup>23</sup> ST II-II.132.4 ad 2: «[L]aus et honor comparantur ad gloriam, ut supra dictum est, sicut causae ex quibus gloria sequitur. Unde gloria comparatur ad ea sicut finis, propter hoc enim aliquis amat honorari et laudari, in quantum per hoc aliquis aestimat se in aliorum notitia fore praeclarum».

### 3. GLORIA AS THE END OF RELIGIOUS WORSHIP

With this understanding of the notion of *gloria* in general, we are now in a position to appreciate Aquinas' account of why religion is a good thing, and in particular his claim that the glory of God is the end of worship. Yet, surprisingly, he does not explicitly use the term *glory* to answer the question of why religion is good. Aquinas opens the first article of his *Treatise on Religion* (ST II-II.81-100) by telling his readers that religion is good because it orders humans to God. Though he does not bring forth his concept of *gloria* at this point, the concept will begin to play a crucial role as we progress through the *Treatise*.

The ultimate foundation in this first article for Aquinas' account of the goodness of religion rests on the Augustinian doctrine on the three genera of "goods." Augustine says that goodness consists in three things: "mode," "form," and "order:"

«For all things, in proportion as they are more measured, formed, and ordered, by so much assuredly do they possess more good. But, in proportion as they are less measured, formed, and ordered, they are less good. These three things, therefore, measure, form, and order – not to speak of innumerable other things that are shown to pertain to these three – these three things, therefore, measure, form, order, are as it were generic goods in things made by God, whether in spirit or in body». <sup>24</sup>

In ST I.5.5, St. Thomas develops this doctrine in a systematic fashion. He tells us that, for a thing to be perfect, it must have not only form, but also all that the form requires and all that follows from that form. Accordingly, "mode" signifies the type of good that is presupposed by the form of a thing, its determination through or commensuration to, for example, material or efficient principles; "species" signifies the form itself; and "order" signifies what follows from it:

«Everything is said to be good insofar as it is perfect; for in that way it is desirable (as shown above ST I.1.3). Now a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. Now, since everything is what it is by its form (and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form, together with all that precedes and follows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient, and this is signified by the mode: hence, it is said that the measure marks the mode. Now, the

<sup>24</sup> AUGUSTINE, *De natura boni*, 3 (PL 42, 553): «Omnia enim quanto magis moderata, speciosa, ordinata sunt, tanto magis utique bona sunt; quanto autem minus moderata, minus speciosa, minus ordinata sunt, minus bona sunt. Haec itaque tria, modus, species et ordo, ut de innumerabilibus taceam quae ad ista tria pertinere monstrantur, haec ergo tria, modus, species, ordo, tamquam generalia bona sunt in rebus a Deo factis, sive in spiritu, sive in corpore».

form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is said to give the species, for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher (*Metaphysics* 10); for as a unit added to, or taken from a number, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from a definition, changes its species. Further, upon the form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for everything, insofar as it is in act, acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and order. Hence, the essence of goodness, insofar as it consists in perfection, consists also in mode, species, and order». <sup>25</sup>

Aquinas utilizes this doctrine in *ST* II-II.81.2 to explain that religion is a virtue. There, he argues that religion is a virtue whose good lies in the genus of "order."

«As stated above (*ST* II-II.58.3; *ST* I-II.55.3, 4) "a virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his act good likewise." Hence we must say that every good act belongs to a virtue. Now it is evident that to render anyone their due has the aspect of good, since by rendering someone their due (*debitum*), one is also placed in a suitable relation to them as though "fittingly ordered to" them. Now, order comes under the aspect of good, just as mode and species, according to Augustine (*De natura boni* 3). Since then it belongs to religion to pay due honor to someone, namely, to God, it is evident that religion is a virtue». <sup>26</sup>

<sup>25</sup> *ST* I.5.5c: «[U]numquodque dicitur bonum, inquantum est perfectum, sic enim est appetibile, ut supra dictum est. Perfectum autem dicitur, cui nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis. Cum autem unumquodque sit id quod est, per suam formam; forma autem praesupponit quaedam, et quaedam ad ipsam ex necessitate consequuntur; ad hoc quod aliquid sit perfectum et bonum, necesse est quod formam habeat, et ea quae praeexiguntur ad eam, et ea quae consequuntur ad ipsam. Praeexigitur autem ad formam determinatio sive commensuratio principiorum, seu efficientium ipsam, et hoc significatur per modum, unde dicitur quod mensura modum praefigit. Ipsa autem forma significatur per speciem, quia per formam unumquodque in specie constituitur. Et propter hoc dicitur quod numerus speciem praebet, quia definitiones significantes speciem sunt sicut numeri, secundum philosophum in VIII *Metaphys.*; sicut enim unitas addita vel subtracta variat speciem numeri, ita in definitionibus differentia apposita vel subtracta. Ad formam autem consequitur inclinatio ad finem, aut ad actionem, aut ad aliquid huiusmodi, quia unumquodque, inquantum est actu, agit, et tendit in id quod sibi convenit secundum suam formam. Et hoc pertinet ad pondus et ordinem. Unde ratio boni, secundum quod consistit in perfectione, consistit etiam in modo, specie et ordine».

<sup>26</sup> *ST* II-II.81.2c: «[S]icut supra dictum est, *virtus est quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit*. Et ideo necesse est dicere omnem actum bonum ad virtutem pertinere. Manifestum est autem quod reddere debitum alicui habet rationem boni, quia per hoc quod aliquis alteri debitum reddit, etiam constituitur in proportione convenienti respectu ipsius, quasi convenienter ordinatus ad ipsum; ordo autem ad rationem boni pertinet, sicut et modus et species, ut per Augustinum patet, in libro de natura boni. Cum igitur ad religionem pertineat reddere honorem debitum alicui, scilicet Deo, manifestum est quod religio virtus est».

This explanation is very revealing. Religion is good because it places humans in a suitable order with respect to God.<sup>27</sup> Thus, the acts of religious worship are good, not because they perfect humans intrinsically, but because through them humans acquire a suitable order in relation to God. In other words, the good of religion transcends a person's intrinsic perfection, that is, the perfection that depends on his or her having the adequate matter and form ("mode" and "species"). Through religion, humans give to God his due, and – as the text above reads—«by rendering someone his due, one is also placed in a suitable relation to him as though fittingly ordered to him». Yet, how exactly is our ordering to God accomplished in religious worship?

The answer lies in Aquinas' account of the finality of religion. As we saw, Aquinas tells us many times that *gloria* is the end of the virtue of religion. And, if we recall, Aquinas develops the Augustinian notion of glory as "splendorous recognition with praise." Thus, we may infer that the end of the virtue of religion is that human beings have «splendorous recognition with praise» of God's intrinsic goodness. This awareness or recognition is the 'divine glory' that the virtue of religion seeks to increase. Yet this is not the whole picture, as other texts seem to point to God's honor and reverence as the end of religion: «It pertains to religion to render due honor to someone, namely, to God»<sup>28</sup>. «The good to which religion is ordered is to show due honor to God»<sup>29</sup>. «To religion pertains doing certain things for the sake of divine reverence»<sup>30</sup>. «Religion... effects those things that are directly and immediately ordered to divine honor»<sup>31</sup>. «Divine *cultus* is ordered [...] primarily to showing reverence to God»<sup>32</sup>. This apparent inconsistency finds a fascinating explanation in Aquinas' account of the relation between religion and the other moral virtues. In *ST II-II.81.6*, he says the virtue of religion is higher than (*praeferenda, praeeminet*) the other moral virtues. His argument is that all the moral virtues have, as their object, things that are means to the ultimate end, God; but of all of these, the *object* of religion is the one that most approaches that ultimate end insofar as its acts are ordered to the *honor of God*.

«Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness from being ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end, the better it is. Now moral virtues, as stated above

<sup>27</sup> Cfr. *ST II-II.81.1*: «[R]eligio proprie importat ordinem ad Deum».

<sup>28</sup> *ST II-II.81.2c*: «[A]d religionem pertineat reddere honorem debitum alicui, scilicet Deo».

<sup>29</sup> *ST II-II.81.4c*: «Bonum autem ad quod ordinatur religio est exhibere Deo debitum honorem»; cfr. 81.7 arg. 2: «Religionis finis est Deo reverentiam et honorem exhibere».

<sup>30</sup> *ST II-II.81.2 ad 1*: «Ad religionem autem pertinet facere aliqua propter divinam reverentiam».

<sup>31</sup> *ST II-II.81.6c*: «Religio [...] operatur ea quae directe et immediate ordinantur in honorem divinum».

<sup>32</sup> *ST II-II.92.2c*: «Ordinatur [...] primo divinus cultus ad reverentiam Deo exhibendam».

[ST II-II.81.5], are about matters that are ordered to God as their end. Now, religion approaches nearer to God than the other moral virtues, insofar as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor of God. Hence, religion is higher than the moral virtues». <sup>33</sup>

Religion is immediately ordered to the honor of God. Other human virtues are not. This gives religion superiority or preeminence over the other human virtues. It is religion's superiority that allows it to 'command' other virtues. Thus, beyond its own proper acts the virtue of religion can influence the acts of other virtues. This is Aquinas' monumentally important doctrine of the 'elicited' and 'commanded' acts of a virtue, which Aquinas explicitly applies to the virtue of religion:

«Religion has two kinds of act: certain proper and immediate acts, which it elicits, through which man is ordered to God alone, such as to sacrifice, to adore, and other suchlike things; and it has other acts which it produces by means of the virtues which it commands, ordering them to divine reverence. For, the virtue to which the end pertains commands the virtues to which those things that are ordered to the end pertain. And according to this "to visit orphans and widows in their tribulation," which is an act elicited by [the virtue of] mercy, is put forward as an act of religion by way of command; and "to keep oneself clean from this world" as an act commanded by religion, but elicited by temperance or some other suchlike virtue». <sup>34</sup>

Due to its superiority, then, the virtue of religion can command the acts of any other moral virtue to this end. Thus, on the one hand religion has elicited acts, such as adoration and sacrifice, which are those that are proper to the virtue and have no other purpose than to give reverence to God. On the other hand, religion also has commanded acts, such as temperance and piety, which are those that are elicited by lower virtues, but are ordered by religion – as by a higher, guiding virtue – to the end of religion.

This key distinction is explained by the different ends (honor, reverence, glo-

<sup>33</sup> ST II-II.81.6C: «[E]a quae sunt ad finem sortiuntur bonitatem ex ordine in finem, et ideo quanto sunt fini propinquiora, tanto sunt meliora. Virtutes autem morales, ut supra habitum est, sunt circa ea quae ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem. Religio autem magis de propinquo accedit ad Deum quam aliae virtutes morales, in quantum operatur ea quae directe et immediate ordinantur in honorem divinum. Et ideo religio praeminet inter alias virtutes morales».

<sup>34</sup> ST II-II.81.1 ad 1: «[R]eligio habet duplices actus. Quosdam quidem proprios et immediatos, quos elicit, per quos homo ordinatur ad solum Deum: sicut sacrificare, adorare et alia huiusmodi. Alios autem actus habet quos producit mediantibus virtutibus quibus imperat, ordinans eos in divinam reverentiam: quia scilicet virtus ad quam pertinet finis, imperat virtutibus ad quas pertinet ea quae sunt ad finem. Et secundum hoc actus religionis per modum imperii ponitur esse visitare pupillos et viduas in tribulatione eorum, quod est actus elicited a misericordia: immaculatum autem custodire se ab hoc saeculo imperative quidem est religionis, elicitive autem temperantiae vel alicuius huiusmodi virtutis».

ry) that Aquinas has assigned to the virtue of religion: «[A]ll things, according as they are done for the glory of God, pertain to religion, not as eliciting, but as commanding. But those things pertain to religion [as] eliciting which, according to the *ratio* of their species, pertain to the reverence of God»<sup>35</sup>. As we saw in the previous section, glory is the end of honor. We honor God so that we may glorify him. And here Aquinas is telling us that the elicited (or proper) acts of the virtue of religion are characterized by the fact that they are all done with the end of honoring God in view. We can infer that they are acts of honoring God for the sake of increasing his (extrinsic) glory. Therefore, in every act of religion, the agent wills God's glory as his or her end. Yet Aquinas is also telling us that the *commanded* acts of religion are done, not for God's honor, but (only) for God's glory. Thus, an act such as almsgiving is not in itself an act of honoring God – it is not an act of worship, like offering a sacrifice or praying. But in both the case of almsgiving and offering sacrifice, the act can be 'raised' to the end of giving glory to God. Thus, what makes an act belong to the virtue of religion – whether as elicited or commanded – is that it is ordered to the glory of God as to its end. Religion raises all other human virtues to God by 'lending' them, so to speak, the higher end of the glory of God.

Consequently, if an act is not done for the glory of God, not only will the act not count as an act of 'religion'; it will not aid the agent to be placed in his or her 'suitable relationship with respect to God', which is the good that religion brings about. For humans cannot obtain their 'suitable order with respect to God' by means of the other human virtues alone, since they do not have this order as their proper end. All acts of the other virtues then need to be 'commanded' by the virtue of religion to the end of the glory of God. This gives us an initial explanation of why religion is good and why humans need to practice the virtue of religion.

#### 4. GLORIA AS THE END OF THE UNIVERSE

Now, the goodness of religion, insofar as it is an 'ordering of humans to God', is best understood within the context of the teleology of the entire universe. When speaking of the end of the universe Aquinas relies on the Aristotelian distinction between *finis cuius* (*to hoû heneka tinos*) and *finis quo* (*to hoû heneka tôi*) in *Metaphysics*, Book *Lambda*: «'That for the sake of which' [that is, the final cause] is both that *for* which and that *towards* which, and of these the one [namely, that *towards* which] is unmovable and the other [namely, that *for*

<sup>35</sup> *ST II-II.81.4 ad 2*: «Ad secundum dicendum quod omnia, secundum quod in gloriam Dei fiunt, pertinent ad religionem non quasi ad elicentem, sed quasi ad imperantem. Illa autem pertinent ad religionem elicentem quae secundum rationem suae speciei pertinent ad reverentiam Dei».

which] is not». <sup>36</sup> Aquinas, in turn, interprets Aristotle's distinction in terms of "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" ends:

«Good, inasmuch as it is the end or goal of a thing, is twofold. For an end is extrinsic to the thing ordered to it, as when we say that a place is the end of something that is moved locally. Or it is intrinsic, as a form is the end of the process of generation or alteration; and a form already acquired is a kind of intrinsic good of the thing whose form it is». <sup>37</sup>

In the *Summa*, he uses the terms *finis quo* and *finis cuius*, terms that refer to the act of using or enjoying and the object used or enjoyed, respectively.

«'End' is twofold, namely, 'for which' (*cuius*) and 'by which', as the Philosopher says, that is, the thing itself and the use of the thing. Thus, to a miser the end is [both] money, and the acquisition of money. Accordingly, God is indeed the ultimate end of a rational creature, as a thing; but created beatitude is the end, as the use, or rather fruition, of the thing». <sup>38</sup>

The universe, accordingly, has two ends: its own internal order or perfection (*finis quo*), and God (*finis cuius*). And Aquinas tells us that these two ends are not independent or unrelated. Rather, the *finis quo* of the universe is ordered to its *finis cuius*; that is to say, the ultimate end of the universe is God, its extrinsic end.

«A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof; this, however, is not its ultimate end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in the twelfth book of the *Metaphysics*». <sup>39</sup>

<sup>36</sup> *Metaphysics* XII.7 (1072b1-3), in J. BARNES (ed.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 1995. See also *De Anima* II.4 (412b2): «The phrase 'for the sake of which' is ambiguous; it may mean either (a) the end to achieve which, or (b) the being in whose interest, the act is done».

<sup>37</sup> In *XII Metaph.*, lect.12, n. 2627, in M.-R. CATHALA and R. SPIAZZI (eds.), *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, Marietti, Turin-Rome 1950: «Bonum enim, secundum quod est finis alicuius, est duplex. Est enim finis extrinsecus ab eo quod est ad finem, sicut si dicimus locum esse finem eius quod movetur ad locum. Est etiam finis intra, sicut forma finis generationis et alterationis, et forma iam adepti, est quoddam bonum intrinsecum eius, cuius est forma».

<sup>38</sup> Cfr. *ST* I.26.3 ad 2: «[F]inis est duplex, scilicet cuius et quo, ut philosophus dicit, scilicet ipsa res, et usus rei, sicut avaro est finis pecunia, et acquisitio pecuniae. Creaturae igitur rationalis est quidem Deus finis ultimus ut res; beatitudo autem creata ut usus, vel magis fruitio, rei».

<sup>39</sup> *ST* I.103.2 ad 3: «[F]inis quidem universi est aliquod bonum in ipso existens, scilicet ordo ipsius universi, hoc autem bonum non est ultimus finis, sed ordinatur ad bonum extrinsecum ut ad ultimum finem; sicut etiam ordo exercitus ordinatur ad ducem, ut dicitur in *XII Metaphys*».

Of the two ends of the universe then, the extrinsic end, namely God, is primary. The universe is not ordered to God for the sake of the universe's own perfection, but vice-versa: the universe's perfection is for the sake of God. Aquinas repeats this thought in much greater detail in his commentary on *Metaphysics*, Book *Lambda*. Recalling the Aristotelian distinction between the *finis quo* and *finis cuius*, he explains that:

«[Aristotle] first says, therefore, that the universe has a good and an end in both ways. For there is a separate good, which is the first mover, on which depend the heavens and the whole of nature, as on its end and desirable good, as was shown. And, because all things whose end is one necessarily agree in their being ordered to that end, it is necessary that in the parts of the universe some order be found; and thus, the universe has both a separate good, and the good of order, just as we see in an army: for the good of the army is both in the very order of the army and in the general that presides over the army: but the good of the army is more so in the general than in its order: for the end is greater in goodness than those things that are ordered to the end: and the order of an army is for the sake of fulfilling the good of the general, that is, the general's will to obtain victory; but the opposite is not the case, [namely, that] the good of the general is for the sake of the good of order. And, because the *ratio* of those things that are ordered to an end is taken from the end, so it is necessary that not only the order of the army be for the sake of the general, but also that the order of the universe come from the general, since the order of the army is for the sake of the general. Thus, also the separate good, that is, the first mover, is a greater good than the good of order that is in the universe. For the whole order of the universe is for the sake of the first mover, so that that which is in the intellect and will of the first mover is unfolded (*explicatur*) in the ordered universe».<sup>40</sup>

With this in mind, we can now reach the culminating point of our study. How can God Himself be the ultimate end of the universe if He is not in need of

<sup>40</sup> Cfr. *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 12, nn. 2629-31: «Dicit ergo primo, quod universum habet utroque modo bonum et finem. Est enim aliquod bonum separatum, quod est primum movens, ex quo dependet caelum et tota natura, sicut ex fine et bono appetibili, ut ostensum est. Et, quia omnia, quorum unum est finis, oportet quod in ordine ad finem conveniant, necesse est, quod in partibus universi ordo aliquis inveniatur; et sic universum habet et bonum separatum, et bonum ordinis. Sicut videmus in exercitu: nam bonum exercitus est et in ipso ordine exercitus, et in duce, qui exercitui praesidet: sed magis est bonum exercitus in duce, quam in ordine: quia finis potior est in bonitate his quae sunt ad finem: ordo autem exercitus est propter bonum ducis adimplendum, scilicet ducis voluntatem in victoriae consecutionem; non autem e converso, bonum ducis est propter bonum ordinis. Et, quia ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem, sumitur ex fine, ideo necesse est quod non solum ordo exercitus sit propter ducem, sed etiam quod a duce sit ordo exercitus, cum ordo exercitus sit propter ducem. Ita etiam bonum separatum, quod est primum movens, est melius bonum bono ordinis, quod est in universo. Totus enim ordo universi est propter primum moventem, ut scilicet explicatur in universo ordinato id quod est in intellectu et voluntate primi moventis. Et sic oportet, quod a primo movente sit tota ordinatio universi».

acquiring anything? How exactly can the universe's perfection be further ordered to God, if He cannot benefit from the universe's being ordered to Him? This question would arise from conceiving the *finis quo* and *finis cuius* of the universe as two distinct entities. But this is not how Aquinas conceives it. To help us see things in a more nuanced way, Aquinas introduces another distinction among ends: that between the *finis agentis* and *finis patientis*, that is, the end of the agent and that of the 'patient' or thing being acted upon. He has us consider the universe as being a single effect with respect to God's primary causality. From this perspective, the *finis agentis* is the manifestation of God's goodness, and the existence and perfection of the universe is the *finis patientis* (the end of the universe *qua* God's effect). Yet this distinction is one of reason. In reality, Aquinas will argue, the *finis agentis* and the *finis patientis* are identical; or, more precisely, they are two *rationes* of the same subject – what we could call a *distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re*, to use later Thomistic terminology. The end of the 'patient' or thing being acted upon is the same as that of the agent, for what the agent intends to impress is what the thing acted upon receives. The end of the universe, then, is God's own end as agent. The manifestation of God's goodness is the perfection of the universe; there is no dichotomy. They are different *rationes*, or aspects, of the same entity. God creates the universe, not that He may obtain a good distinct from the universe, but that creatures may obtain, and thus manifest, His goodness:

«Every agent acts for an end. Otherwise, one thing would not follow more than another from the action of an agent, unless it were by chance. Now the end of the agent (*finis agentis*) and of the thing being acted upon (*patientis*) considered as such are the same, but in different ways. For the impression that the agent aims to produce, and that the thing being acted upon aims to receive, are one and the same. Certain things, however, simultaneously both act and are acted upon: these are imperfect agents, and to these it belongs, even in acting, to aim to acquire something. But, it does not belong to the first agent, who is agent only, to act for the acquisition of some end. He aims only to communicate his perfection, which is his goodness. And every creature aims to attain its own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection and goodness. Therefore, the divine goodness is in this way the end of all things». <sup>41</sup>

<sup>41</sup> *ST I.44.4C*: «[O]mne agens agit propter finem, alioquin ex actione agentis non magis sequeretur hoc quam illud, nisi a casu. Est autem idem finis agentis et patientis, in quantum huiusmodi, sed aliter et aliter, unum enim et idem est quod agens intendit imprimere, et quod patiens intendit recipere. Sunt autem quaedam quae simul agunt et patiuntur, quae sunt agentia imperfecta, et his convenit quod etiam in agendo intendant aliquid acquirere. Sed primo agenti, qui est agens tantum, non convenit agere propter acquisitionem alicuius finis; sed intendit solum communicare suam perfectionem, quae est eius bonitas. Et unaquaeque creatura intendit consequi suam perfectionem, quae est similitudo perfectionis et bonitatis divinae. Sic ergo divina bonitas est finis rerum omnium» (cfr. *Summa contra gentiles* 3.18, nn. 4-5, in P. MARC, C. PERA, P. CARAMELLO (eds.), *Liber de veritate catholicae Fidei contra errores infidelium seu Summa contra Gentiles*, Marietti, Turin-Rome 1961: «Si aliquid agat

Thus, God does not seek to obtain from the perfection of the universe any further, distinct perfection in Himself. Rather, what he seeks to accomplish is the manifestation of His goodness, which consists in the perfection of the universe itself.

There is a sense, however, in which the divine *finis agentis* is still primary: the goodness of the *finis patientis* is reducible to that of the *finis agentis* insofar as the former is done for the sake of the latter.<sup>42</sup> It is at this point that Aquinas introduces the concept of *gloria*. He tells us explicitly that the *glory* of God is the extrinsic end (or *finis cuius*).<sup>43</sup> Yet, when explaining how this is so, he has us consider the ordering of a creature's *finis quo* to its *finis cuius* in various steps, as it were. A creature's most proximate *finis quo* is its own operation. This operation is ordered to another: that creature's relation to higher creatures (e.g., inanimate bodies for the sake of humans). This, in turn, is ordered to the perfection of the entire universe. But none of these ends is without qualification that creature's ultimate end. The perfection of the universe is itself ordered *to the glory of God*: «A corporeal creature can be considered as made either for the sake of its proper act, or for other creatures, or for the whole universe, or for the glory of God»<sup>44</sup>.

Aquinas explains this idea in detail when he asks whether corporeal creatures are made on account of God's goodness:

«Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to the parts of that whole, we shall find, first, that each and every part exists for the sake of its proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing; second, that less honorable parts exist for the more honorable, as the senses for the intellect, the lungs for the heart; and, third, that all parts are for

propter rem aliquam iam existentem, et per eius actionem aliquid constituatur, oportet quod rei propter quam agit aliquid acquiratur ex actione agentis: sicut si milites pugnant propter ducem, cui acquiritur victoria, quam milites suis actionibus causant. Deo autem non potest aliquid acquiri ex actione cuiuslibet rei: est enim sua bonitas omnino perfecta, ut in primo libro ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus sit finis rerum, non sicut aliquid constitutum aut effectum a rebus, neque ita quod aliquid ei a rebus acquiratur, sed hoc solo modo, quia ipse rebus acquiritur. Item. Oportet quod eo modo effectus tendat in finem quo agens propter finem agit. Deus autem qui est primum agens omnium rerum, non sic agit quasi sua actione aliquid acquirat, sed quasi sua actione aliquid largiatur: quia non est in potentia ut aliquid acquirere possit, sed solum in actu perfecto, ex quo potest elargiri. Res igitur non ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem cui aliquid acquiratur, sed ut ab ipso ipsummet suo modo consequantur, cum ipsemet sit finis».

<sup>42</sup> Cfr. *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1c: «[F]inis operis semper reducitur in finem operantis».

<sup>43</sup> For a modern, concise scholastic argument for why the glory of God is the *finis cuius* of creation, see E. HUGON, *op. cit.*, pp. 301-302.

<sup>44</sup> *ST I.70.2c*: «[C]reatura aliqua corporalis potest dici esse facta vel propter actum proprium, vel propter aliam creaturam, vel propter totum universum, vel propter gloriam Dei».

the perfection of the whole, as the matter for the form, since the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. Furthermore, the whole man is on account of an extrinsic end, that end being the fruition of God. So, therefore, in the parts of the universe also every creature exists for its own proper act and perfection, and the less noble for the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than man exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature exists for the perfection of the entire universe. Ultimately, the entire universe, with all its parts, is ordered towards God as its end, insofar as, in them, through a certain imitation, the divine goodness is represented, to the glory of God». <sup>45</sup>

Hence, the ultimate end of all corporeal things is God – as the text above reads – «insofar as, in them, through a certain imitation, the divine goodness is represented, to the glory of God». Observe that Aquinas does not say that the end of all things is their (intrinsic) representation of God's goodness. Rather, the creaturely representation is ordered to the ultimate end, which is the (extrinsic) glory of God. The glory of God is God's ultimate end, the *finis cuius* of His act of creation. God does not seek His glory for the sake of anything else; rather, He seeks everything else for the sake of it. «[T]o know the divine goodness is the ultimate end of the rational creature, for in this beatitude consists; hence, the glory of God is not referred to something else [i.e., an ulterior end], rather, it belongs to God Himself that he seek His own glory for its own sake» <sup>46</sup>.

Now, this last text in mentioning rational creatures reminds us of an important fact. That the universe is made for the “glory of God” makes no sense unless humans or at least angels are somehow involved in the teleology of the universe. For as we saw above *gloria* is a rational phenomenon: it is a (rational)

<sup>45</sup> *ST* 1.65.2c: «Si autem alicuius totius et partium eius velimus finem assignare, invenimus primo quidem, quod singulae partes sunt propter suos actus; sicut oculus ad videndum. Secundo vero, quod pars ignobilior est propter nobiliorem; sicut sensus propter intellectum, et pulmo propter cor. Tertio vero, omnes partes sunt propter perfectionem totius, sicut et materia propter formam, partes enim sunt quasi materia totius. Ulterius autem, totus homo est propter aliquem finem extrinsecum, puta ut fruatur Deo. Sic igitur et in partibus universi, unaquaque creatura est propter suum proprium actum et perfectionem. Secundo autem, creaturae ignobiliores sunt propter nobiliores sicut creaturae quae sunt infra hominem, sunt propter hominem. Ulterius autem, singulae creaturae sunt propter perfectionem totius universi. Ulterius autem, totum universum, cum singulis suis partibus, ordinatur in Deum sicut in finem, in quantum in eis per quandam imitationem divina bonitas repraesentatur ad gloriam Dei, quamvis creaturae rationales speciali quodam modo supra hoc habeant finem Deum, quem attingere possunt sua operatione, cognoscendo et amando. Et sic patet quod divina bonitas est finis omnium corporalium».

<sup>46</sup> *Quaestiones disputatae de malo* 9.1 ad 4: «Ad quartum dicendum, quod cognoscere divinam bonitatem, est ultimus finis rationalis creaturae, in hoc enim beatitudo consistit: unde gloria Dei non est ad aliquid aliud referenda, sed proprium ipsius Dei est ut gloria eius propter seipsam quaeratur».

“splendorous recognition with praise.” God made the universe, not just in order to make his intrinsic goodness extrinsically manifest, but so that humans would come to know this manifestation, and thus have ‘splendorous recognition with praise’ of His excellence (i.e., give Him glory). The end of the representation of the divine goodness in the physical universe then is human beings’ recognition of the divine excellence. «For all creatures are a way (*via*) for humans to tend to the divine beatitude; and again every creature is ordered to the glory of God insofar as in them the divine goodness is manifested»<sup>47</sup>. The extrinsic glory of God, then, ultimately consists in rational creatures recognizing God’s excellence.

Thus, the teleology of the universe and the end of the virtue of religion coincide. Both are ordered to the glory of God. Now we can see what Aquinas means when he says that the good of religion does not fall within the generic good of “species,” but within that of “order.” As we saw, Aquinas tells us in *ST II-II.81.2c* that honor is good because through it a human being submits to God and thus, «by rendering someone his due, one is also placed in a suitable relation to him as though fittingly ordered to him». A human being’s ordering to God is accomplished through the virtue of religion, by ordering all the acts of the other human virtues to the glory of God. The order to God is what gives the divine honor proper to religion, as well as the proper ends of all other virtues, the aspect of good. Therefore a person’s intrinsic perfection, the *finis quo*, is not without qualification the ultimate end. As Aquinas explains in his exposition on the Lord’s Prayer in *ST II-II.83.9c*, we primarily will God’s glory, and only secondarily do we will to enjoy it:

«Thus, it is evident that the first thing to be the object of our desire is the end, and afterwards whatever is directed to the end. Now our end is God, towards whom our affections tend in two ways: first, by our willing the glory of God, secondly, by willing to enjoy His glory. The first belongs to the love whereby we love God in Himself, while the second belongs to the love whereby we love ourselves in God. Hence the first petition [of the Lord’s Prayer] is expressed thus: “Hallowed be Thy name,” and the second thus: “Thy kingdom come,” by which we ask to come to the glory of His kingdom».<sup>48</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Cfr. *Quaestio disputata de caritate*, in E. ODETTO (ed.), *Quaestiones disputatae*, 10<sup>th</sup> ed., Marietti, Turin-Rome 1965: «Omnes enim creaturae sunt homini via ad tendendum in beatitudinem; et iterum omnes creaturae ordinantur ad gloriam Dei, in quantum in eis divina bonitas manifestatur».

<sup>48</sup> *ST II-II.83.9c*: «Manifestum est autem quod primo cadit in desiderio finis; deinde ea quae sunt ad finem. Finis autem noster Deus est. In quem noster affectus tendit dupliciter, uno quidem modo, prout volumus gloriam Dei; alio modo, secundum quod volumus frui gloria eius. Quorum primum pertinet ad dilectionem qua Deum in seipso diligimus, secundum vero pertinet ad dilectionem qua diligimus nos in Deo. Et ideo prima petitio ponitur, sanctificetur nomen tuum, per quam petimus gloriam Dei. Secunda vero ponitur, adveniat regnum tuum, per quam petimus ad gloriam regni eius pervenire».

## 5. CONCLUSION

In sum, I have done three things. First (I), I unpacked the philosophical notion of *gloria* in Aquinas, defending the later Thomistic distinction between the 'intrinsic' and the 'extrinsic' glory of God as being textually warranted and philosophically important, and showing its connection to related concepts such as 'honor' and 'reverence'. Second (II), I pieced together Aquinas' account of the goodness and finality of religion by examining the relationship between God's 'glory', 'honor' and 'reverence', explaining how this represents an ordering of humans, and all their virtuous acts, to God. And, finally (III), I offered an account of the role that *gloria* plays in Aquinas' creation metaphysics, and how this account relates to his doctrine of *gloria* as the end of the virtue of religion. Utilizing the distinction between the *finis quo* and *finis cuius* of the universe, I have argued that, for Aquinas, God wills the perfection of the universe for the sake of manifesting His goodness, so that rational creatures become aware and recognize God's goodness and excellence. This rational recognition of God's excellence is what Aquinas calls God's (extrinsic) glory. Thus, the end of religion and the end of the universe coincide.

My ultimate aim in this essay has been not only to elucidate this forgotten concept in Aquinas, but also to show that it is essentially a philosophical concept that despite its theological connotations and applications can be handled rationally and independently of divine revelation. Hence we saw that the basic meaning of the concept in Aquinas belongs to the realm of natural psychology, one that we ultimately traced back to Cicero as its source. Moreover, the crucial role it plays in his philosophy of religion further illustrate its philosophical mileage, insofar as it serves as the final answer to questions regarding the finality of both the human virtues and of creation.

**ABSTRACT:** *The concept of gloria is a legitimately philosophical notion – and not just a theological one – that plays a crucial role in Aquinas' philosophy of religion. Despite this fact, the concept has been given little philosophical attention in the secondary literature. The aim of this essay is twofold: (1) to fill this lacuna by showing the crucial role this concept plays in Aquinas' religious ethics and metaphysics of creation, in particular in his account of the finality of both the human virtues and of the created universe; and also (2) to show that it is essentially a philosophical concept that despite its theological connotations and applications can be handled rationally and independently of divine revelation.*

**KEY WORDS:** *glory, Aquinas, finality, religion, creation.*