"Being as True" according to Aquinas

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Sommario: *1. Linguistic analysis,* philosophia prima, *and "being as true". 2. Aristotle and Aquinas on* verum *as a sense of* ens. *3. The reflective dimension of truth (the judgment). 4. The connection between the dimensions of reflection and correspondence. 5. The incommensurability of judgment and concept.*

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1. Linguistic analysis, *philosophia prima*, and "being as true"

It is almost a commonplace — at least among certain sectors of present-day philosophers — to say that linguistic analysis is a metamorphosis of the transcendental philosophy of Kant: and that this, in its turn, is a metamorphosis of traditional metaphysics[1].

Firmly among those who uphold this we can place Ernst Tugendhat, who sets out an ambitious account of these transformations in his book *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie*, translated into English with the apt title *Traditional and Analytical Philosophy*[2]. Tugendhat presents us with a profound and wide-ranging account of analytical philosophy, which he offers us as a new *philosophia prima*, capable of restating and resolving the problems posed by classical metaphysics and transcendental philosophy from the more radical standpoint which it claims. This standpoint is that of formal semantics.

According to Tugendhat, this standpoint of analytical philosophy offers a firmer and broader foundation for the resolution of these problems than either traditional ontology or the Kantian critique. Neither of these, he claims, has managed to transcend their objectivist foundations: in so far, that is, that neither has taken the truth of propositions as its fundamental aim. The claim made for the new "first philosophy" which radical linguistic analysis provides, is that it alone can achieve universality, radicality, and rigour, by clearing up the different *senses of being*, and that to take *ens*

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[1] Cf. K.O. APEL, *Transformation der Philosophie*, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp 1976.
[2] E. TUGENDHAT, *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1976; *Traditional and Analytical Philosophy. Lectures on the Philosophy of Language*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1982.

as the central topic of metaphysics, or to concentrate on its epistemological counterpart, the object, makes this impossible. These "senses of being" are presented to us in the different linguistic uses of the verb "to be": the uses in which this verb expresses existence, identity, predication, and the different logical modalities. All these senses are to be sought in propositions. Thus they can be seen as different species, as it were, of what Aristotle called "being as the true" (ον ως αληθες): what Tugendhat calls *das veritative Sein*, veritative being. This 'being in the sense of being true' is what I shall call here "being as true" or "being as the true", literally translating Aristotle's label.

This idea is not peculiar to Tugendhat. Brentano had already given primacy, among the 'many senses of being' which Aristotle recognizes, to this sense of being as true, claiming that it includes all the others, and that it can be used as a basis for an account of the *real* and the *unreal*[3]. This is also, in my opinion, the main thrust of Heidegger's hermeneutics: the primary sense of being is its truth or unveiling (αληθεια)[4]. But radical linguistic analysis goes beyond this, claiming that neither phenomenology nor existential hermeneutics have managed to go beyond the objectivist, gnoseological level. In this level reflection remains shackled to supposed incommunicable experiences, or at best to the explanation of meanings of words. They fail to reach the level of understanding sentences, and it is only at this level that being as true, veritative being, can be found.

It can be claimed — as Tugendhat in fact does claim — that when radicalized linguistic analysis confronts its traditional roots, in order to work the transformation or metamorphosis we have referred to, it can make the following complaint: «If Aristotle and his heirs had taken "being as the true" as the central thread of their account, they would have produced a formal semantics of assertoric propositions. But instead of this, the notion of being as true, which Aristotle had touched on, becomes distorted in the Middle Ages by being adopted in the curious form of the doctrine which speaks of *verum* as another "transcendental" determination of *ens*, together with *unum* and *aliquid*. According to this doctrine this sense of "to be" is put on the same level as the others, and thus ends up objectivized»[5].

"Being as true" thus provides a useful point of comparison between the self-appointed "new *philosophia prima*" of linguistic analysis and classical metaphysics[6]. It is, however, at first sight somewhat surprising that someone who knows his Aristotle as well as does Tugendhat[7] should fail to point out that Aristotle does more than "touch on" the problem. Also we should say that the medieval doctrine of the transcendental *verum* is not really so curious after all, and that far from eliminating the *esse ut verum* sense of this verb it actually provides an ontological foundation for it. This we can see in the metaphysics of Aquinas. We should say also that it is ignoring the "truth of things" — the transcendental *verum* — that leads philosophers to lose sight of the real nature of "being as true", veritative being. That is precisely why

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[3] F. BRENTANO, *Die Abkehr von Nichtrealen*, Francke, Berna-München 1966. Cf. the "Einleitung" by F. MAYER-HILLEBRAND, *op. cit.*, pp. 255 ff.

[4] Cf. O. POEGGELER, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, Neske, Pfullingen 1963.

[5] TUGENDHAT, *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie*, p. 72.

[6] I have discussed this comparison in: *Metafísica y Lenguaje*, Eunsa, Pamplona 1984.

[7] E. TUGENDHAT, *Ti kata tinos. Eine Untersuchung zu Struktur und Ursprung Aristotelischer Grundbegriffe*, Alber, Freiburg i. B.-München 1958.

in modern philosophy, especially since Kant, "being as true" has been assigned a role in the foundations of metaphysics which does not correspond to it.

2. Aristotle and Aquinas on *verum* as a sense of *ens*

Aristotle does not in fact limit himself to merely alluding to "being as true". Rather, it was he who discovered this notion to be a distinct notion, so to speak, and laid down the basic guidelines for its study. He draws a distinction between being as true (ον ως αληθες) and being in the principal sense, or in the strict sense (ον κυριως): that is, the real being or existence of some actual thing. He does this as a necessary condition of setting up metaphysics as episteme. This distinction can be used in this way because it enables us to avoid the trap of confusing logic with metaphysics: a trap which has been set for metaphysics from the earliest times, and which continues to be a danger.

In Book V of the *Metaphysics* Aristotle tells us what we are to understand by "being as true". *To be* and *is* mean that something is true, and *not to be* means that it is not true but false, in either affirmation or negation[8]. St Thomas, in his commentary, tells us that "to be" and "is" mean the putting together *(compositio)* of the proposition, which is made by the intellect which puts together and take apart *(componit et dividit)*. In this sense "being" means the truth[9]. But here we are not discussing the *veritas rei*, the transcendental *verum* which Tugendhat has referred to (what is later called "ontological truth"). What "being" means here is rather that something which is *said* is true. What is true here is not the *res* but the *dictum*. We are dealing, then, with a *de dicto* truth: something like what is later called "logical truth". And St Thomas goes on to say a little later that truth in this second sense (logical truth) depends on truth in its first sense (ontological truth): they are related as an effect to its cause. From the fact that something is or is not in the nature of things, there follows truth or falsehood in a proposition, which is expressed by the intellect by the use of the verb "is" as a verbal copula[10]. Hence *esse ut verum*, which from a formal point of view is a logical, semantic notion, depends on the transcendental, ontological *verum*.

However, it is not the case that every time there is an *esse ut verum* formed by the intellect, there must always be a real being, an actual existent, in external reality, to which the *esse ut verum* directly corresponds. The fact is that the intellect can think of and judge about what is not an actual existent, not a real being: and then there is *esse ut verum* without a real *esse*, a real *ens*, to which it corresponds. This occurs, for instance, in the case of negations and privations. If I say "Blindness exists" I utter a true proposition, but blindness is not a *true being* in the nature of things: not an *ens*, and therefore not something which has the transcendental *verum*.

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8 *Metaph.*, V, 7, 1017 a 31-33.

9 *In V Metaph.*, lect. 9, n. 895.

10 «Sciendum est autem quod iste secundus modus comparatur ad primum, sicut effectus ad causam. Ex hoc enim quod aliquid in rerum natura est, sequitur veritas et falsitas in propositione, quam intellectus significat per hoc verbum *est* prout est verbalis copula». *In V Metaph.*, lect. 9, n. 896; cf. *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 12, ad 3.

What blindness is in reality is only a privation of being[11]. This consideration makes it clear that being as true is something merely accidental to real being. That something happens to be affirmed of a thing is, precisely, something that just happens to be the case (*accidit*). St Thomas maintains as a fundamental thesis that it is not reality which depends on knowledge, but rather knowledge which depends on reality[12]. In this way even the existential predicate "is" or "exists" can be predicated accidentally, if it is understood in the *esse ut verum* sense. If, on the other hand, it is taken in the sense of signifying *esse proprium*, it is a substantial predicate. This is the position which St Thomas takes up in his mature period, in opposition to Avicenna[13].

"Being as true" occurs in a putting together in the intellect, an intellectual composition, which corresponds to the being of things, to really existent reality. (I use here the word "corresponds" to translate "*adaequatur*", as there is no other convenient English equivalent. Its use should not be taken to commit me to a naïve correspondence theory of truth. As we shall see later, the theory of *adaequatio* — correspondence in my sense — can be used precisely to show up and to transcend the weaknesses of such theories). Obviously this relation of correspondence is not one which is to be found in the real world. But neither is it to be found in every intentional act. As Aristotle says, «true and false are not in things, as if good were true and bad false, but in thought (εν διανοια); and with reference to simple things and to essences, not even in thought»[14]. This should make it obvious that I am not equating "being as true" with intentional being or intentional existence (*esse intentionale*). As Inciarte[15] has pointed out, both being as true and intentional existence are modes of being which are to be found in intellectual operations, operations which radically transcend the powers of corporeal and animal nature. But intentional existence belongs to the cognoscitive species, the likenesses of thought, and is a *part* of the life of those living beings for whom to live is to think. Being as true, on the other hand, is to be found in judgements; but it belongs to judgements *not* in so far as they are the operations of intellectual living beings, but in so far as in those judgments there is a correspon-dence to reality: that is to say, being as true belongs to true judgements not in so far as they are judged, but in so far as they are true.

But it would be equally mistaken to identify being as true with what we could call "logical being": that is, as the scholastics would say, the being of *secundae inten-tiones*. *Secundae intentiones*, it is said, possess only a "being of reason": they are one kind of what were traditionally called *entia rationis*. They are, that is, only objectivizations of features of our discourse, *logos*, pure objects, and nothing more. Being as true, by contrast, is not something which exists solely within the mind, not something which has its beginning and end there: it always has a further reference to the reality on which the truth of the proposition in question depends.

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[11] Cf. *In I Sent.*. d. 34, q.1, a.1; *Contra Gentiles*, III, c.9, a.6; *Quodlibet.* IX, q.2, a.3; *S.Th.*, I, q.48, a.2, ad 2.

[12] «Accidit autem unicuique rei quod aliquid de ipsa vere affirmatur intellectus vel voce. Nam res non refertur ad scientiam, sed e converso». *In V Metaph.*, lect. 9, n. 896.

[13] Cf. *Quodlibet.* XII, q.5, a.1.

[14] *Metaph.*, VI, 4, 1027 b 25-28.

[15] F. INCIARTE, *Ser veritativo y ser existencial*, «Anuario Filosófico», XIII-2 (1980), pp. 22-23.

3. The reflective dimension of truth (the judgment)

From a formal point of view, being as true is to be found in propositions; but in a more fundamental way it is to be found rather in reality. This foundation in reality, moreover, is *esse* rather than essence: *veritas fundatur in esse rei, magis quam in quidditate*[16]. Being as true, then, has two dimensions: the composition made by the intellect in judging, and the correspondence between this composition and reality. This correspondence has as its cause the being, the *esse*, of the thing about which judgment is made. And these two dimensions are also the two aspects of the notion of truth; because being as true is simply the *being of truth*, the mode of existence by which truth exists.

The success of any theory of truth depends on whether it manages to make clear the internal connexions of the two aspects I have referred to: the aspect of correspondence, and the aspect of the special reflection which is carried out by the intellect when it composes or divides. There is, in fact, no correspondence of truth unless there is reflection, and no reflection of truth without correspondence. The two dimensions are not in opposition, but depend each on the other.

We can only attain to the truth, and we can only grasp the fact of correspondence, when we judge: it is in the judgment that the reflexive structure of the mind is put into act. Aquinas tells us in the *Summa Theologiae*[17] that the intellect is able to know its conformity with the thing when it judges that the thing is as the form grasped is. This does not occur in sensation, nor in concepts, but only in judgement. The true is in the judgement as the known in the knower (*ut cognitum in cognoscente*). This is just what being as true is: the being, the mode of existence, by which the known thing *as such* is in the knowing subject. It is not the being or mode of existence of the thing known, nor yet the being or mode of existence of the act of intellection (of thought): what it is is the being, the mode of existence, of the thing known or thought of *in so far as* it is known or thought of.

According to this classical theory, truth is the conformity of the knower in act with the known in act. At the level of simple apprehension the intellect is not yet fully in act with regard to the being, the real existence, of the thing grasped. This complete actualization only occurs in the judgment. As Hoenen has pointed out, the difference between the two operations, in this respect, is the following: «In apprehension, the spirit does not yet know whether the content of its representation conforms or not to reality, to the *res*; but when it judges, it does know»[18].

To be sure, being as true is "*being in propositions*": but it goes outside the realm of propositional comparison or separation, because it includes a reference to the real being, the real actual existence, of the thing judged about. In the proposition there is a comparison made between what is understood and the thing itself, since the proposition affirms or denies that the thing really has that form which the predicate attributes to it. If being as true occurs only in propositions, this is precisely because it is in propositions that we attain to the real being or existence of things. The intentional

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[16] *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q.5, a.1; cf. *In I Sent.* d. 33, q.1, a.1, ad 1.
[17] *S.Th.*, I, q.16, a.2.
[18] A. HOENEN, *La théorie du jugement d'aprés S. Thomas d'Aquin*, Analecta Gregoriana, Roma 1953[2], p. 9.

existence of concepts is relative to the forms which they represent; but the *esse ut verum* of judgement synthesizes the different formal aspects which are grasped by means of concepts, and relates this composition of the judgement to the composition of subject and form within the thing judged of.

The "advantage" which being as true has over mere intentional existence comes from two sources. It comes from the priority of *esse* over form in reality, and from the greater degree of cognitive intensity in the mind which the reflection of judgment has when compared with simple conceptual representation. The *plus* on the side of greater penetration of the formality of what is real — that is, its being grasped *as* real — springs from the *plus* on the side of the formality of knowledge, that is, its being known *as* known. As Millán-Puelles says, «it is only in the judgement of the intellect that the truth of knowledge is at the same time knowledge of the truth: and as such it is formally logical truth, truth known as such. Understood in this way, truth is indeed *adaequatio intellectus cum re*; but it is not a blind correspondence, but rather a correspondence which is known, apprehended, grasped. In this way, in its act of judgement the intellect knows itself *as* corresponding or conforming to what it is judging about»[19].

Thus there are two dimensions of being as true: its formal character, which is epistemological, and its referential role, which is ontological. And each implies the other. Aquinas deals with this under the label of reflection in a superb text: «The intellect reflects on its act, not only in so far as it knows it, but also in so far as it knows its conformity with things. This, of course, could not be known unless the nature of the act itself were known. And this cannot be known unless the nature of the active principle (which is what the intellect is) is known; for it is to this that we ascribe the intellect's conforming itself with things. Hence the intellect knows the truth when it reflects on itself»[20]. Truth, then, has to be known in one and the same act as that in which *both* the thing known *and* the nature of the knower are grasped. Strictly speaking, the thing known is the only terminus of this intellectual act: by means of one species or likeness, that of the object, we know the object, the act of the intellect which corresponds to it, and the active principle of this act[21]. If we had to have recourse to a further judgement to grasp the truth of this judgment, there would be no escaping an infinite regress. As Thomas himself says, it is proper to the intellect to understand itself in so far as it assimilates or conceives in itself something which can be understood: so since the intellect itself becomes intelligible by conceiving something intelligible, it follows that the understanding and the intelligible are one thing[22].

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[19] A. MILLAN-PUELLES, *La estructura de la subjetividad*, Rialp, Madrid 1967, p. 348.

[20] *De Veritate*, q.1, a.9.

[21] Cf. *In I De Anima*, lect. 9.

[22] «Hoc est de ratione intellectus, quod intelligat seipsum inquantum transumit vel concipit in se aliquid intelligibilis; fit enim intellectus intelligibilis per hoc quod attingit aliquod intelligibile. Et ideo, cum ipse intellectus fiat intelligibilis concipiendo aliquod intelligibile, sequatur quod idem sit intellectus et intelligibile». *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 8, n. 2539.

4. The connection between the dimensions of reflection and correspondence

Truth consists precisely in the identity of the intellect and the understood, which is expressed by the verb "to be" in its veritative sense, that is, when it means that things are as is thought or said. Conformity or correspondence, then, is not a mere likeness or copy, but a reflexively known identity. It cannot be sought as if it were a mere similarity. This, I think, is the chief *paradox of truth*: the fact that correspondence as true can only occur with a mode of being, of existence, different from that of things in reality. This different mode of being or existence is *esse ut verum*, and because it is different it allows correspondence.

Unfortunately, as philosophers have forgotten *esse ut verum* they have tended to misunderstand truth as correspondence. Both defenders and opponents of correspondence have all too often forgotten that there can be no correspondence without reflection, and that reflection and correspondence are two aspects of being as true.

To put it plainly: if we ignore the role of reflection, the theory of truth as correspondence is indefensible. It looks like an obviously attractive theory, but it leads to intractable problems: so intractable that the theory has to be abandoned. But if we ignore correspondence, we can find no other theory which will give a satisfactory account of the *being of truth*, that is, the mode of existence by which truth exists.

Frege, in one of his last published articles ("Der Gedanke"), makes a brilliant and profound investigation of what he calls 'true being' *(Wahrsein)*. He makes a careful examination of the insuperable difficulties of the "agreement" *(Ueberein-stimmung)* or correspondence theory of truth. It leads inevitably to a vicious regress or a vicious circle[23]. A theory which sees truth as pictorial agreement, or isomorphism, is impossible. We can see this *a posteriori* in the self-defeating programme of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. But not every theory of truth as correspondence needs to share the same fate.

It is obvious that a representation cannot have exactly the same traits or qualities as what represents, and the more perfect a representation it is the *less* it will share these qualities. Thus we can represent the curve of a high-tension cable by drawing a line which follows more or less the same curve on a piece of paper. But the curve is more accurately represented by the appropriate mathematical equation. The equation is a *likeness* of the curve, but paradoxically is nothing like it.

If a representation were a representation by virtue of having the same features as what is represented, then representation would be impossible, unless the things represented were themselves my representations. But if this is the case then we get into even greater difficulties, as Frege again points out[24].

If we refuse to admit being as true as *another* mode of being, which consists in the reflective identification of the knower with the known, then we cannot give an account of truth in terms of correspondence. *Esse ut verum* cannot be physical existence, because physical existence only allows isomorphic correspondence, which the correspondence of truth cannot be.

But neither is "being as true" mere intentional existence, though in its own way

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[23] G. FREGE, *Der Gedanke*, in *Kleine Schriften*, pp. 343-344.
[24] Cf. FREGE, *op. cit.*, pp. 354-355.

it is something intentional. To reach the level of formal truth we cannot remain content with attending only to the intentional existence of mental representations. This is because mental representations are still images, even if they are *images-of*: formal signs which have an immediate reference to their object. We do not possess isolated concepts in a reflective manner: we do not possess them *as* corresponding to the reality they represent. We know what they represent, but we do not yet know it *as known*. Hence on this representative level we have not yet encountered formal correspondence: and if we were to try to solve the problem of the *being of truth*, the mode of existence by which truth exists at this level we would be forced into an infinite regress. What we are looking for, and fail to find, in this regress, is the solid ground of formal truth, which bears no reference to a further truth, but only to the reality which is grasped. But in order to get our feet on this solid ground we need to go up to a higher epistemological level. If we go back from representation to representation, the search can never end. We cannot come to a decision about true and false at the level of representation: unless, that is, we decide to insist that a certain kind representation — the clear and distinct ones, for example, or those which are coherent with the rest — are as such true. But then we fall into the other trap which is set on this inconclusive pathway: that of vicious circularity, which makes us "discover" that the true is what previously we have already decided to call true.

5. The incommensurability of judgment and concept

When we consider being as true, we see very clearly that judgement and concept are incommensurable[25]. This incommensurability is systematically ignored by the representationism of the rationalists, and it is totally beyond the grasp of the nominalists.

To this it may be objected that the judgement itself is a *conceptus*, in so far as it is a production of the mind; that it is the immanent term of an intellectual activity of the knower, as the concept is. This is quite true; but it is also true that it is a superior, more perfect activity of the mind than conceptual apprehension is. Judgement is not just a complex concept, because in it the knower returns completely on himself. This is the *reditio completa* of which Aquinas speaks in *De Veritate*, quoting the *Liber de Causis*[26]: in which we achieve the cognitive possession of reality *as such*, that is, truth.

Esse ut verum is what is added in judgement, over and above what there is in reality and its likeness in the concept. When Thomas argues in favour of the thesis that truth is not properly in the concept, but only in the judging intellect, he mentions

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[25] Cf. F. BRENTANO, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt.* Vol. II: *Von de Klasifikation der psychischen Phaänomene*, Duncker und Humboldt, Leipzig 1911², p. 35.

[26] «Cuius est ratio, quia illa quae sunt pefectissima in entibus, redeunt ad essentiam suam reditione completa: in hoc autem quod cognoscunt aliquid extra se positum, quodammodo extra se procedunt; secundum vero quod cognoscunt se cognoscere, iam ad se redire incipiunt, quia actus cognitionis est medius inter cognoscentem et cognitum. Sed reditus iste completur secundum quod cognoscunt essentias proprias: unde dicitur in libro *De Causis*, quod omnis sciens essentiam suam, est rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa». *De Veritate*, q.1, a.9.

precisely this *novum* of the correspondence which is proper to truth, which cannot be reduced to the likeness of the thing which we find in the concept. The paradox of truth which I have already mentioned is formulated by Aquinas in this way: «When the intellect forms concepts, it has only the likeness of the things outside the mind, as is the case also with the sense which receives the species of a sensible thing. But when it makes a judgement about the thing it grasps, this intellectual judgement is something proper to it, which is not to be found in external things (*quoddam pro - prium ei, quod non invenitur extra in re*). And judgement is said to be true when it corresponds to the external thing»[27].

Hence the *novum* of truth cannot be sought within real being, although it is foun- ded on it. But neither is it found in the representation. In so far as the representation is like the real form, it is no other than the real form itself, in so far as considered by the mind (*signum formale*), and hence it cannot *correspond* with the real form. But in so far as the representation is unlike the real form, that is to say, in so far as it is specifi- cally representational or intentional, it fails to correspond to reality. The new *being of truth* is not the physical existence of the thing, nor yet the intentional existence of the representation, but is rather a being in the judgement, and hence in the proposition.

What new contribution is made by being as true can be seen even more clearly when it is not there, that is, when a proposition is *not* true. *Esse ut verum* is then ʻconspicuous by its absence: the proposition ought to be true, but it is not. This makes sense of the enigmatic remarks of Aristotle about non-being as false (το μη ον ως το ψευδος)[28], which Aquinas calls *non ens quod dicitur quasi falsum*[29]. When a proposition is not true, it lacks nothing which it needs to be truly a proposi- tion, but it lacks everything which it needs to be a proposition which is true, that is, it lacks being as true. There is nothing missing from the reality which is known, nor form the representative elements which the judgement puts together; but truth is nowhere to be found, precisely because truth is something over and above what is contributed to the judgement by the real form or its representation. The privation of this "something over and above" of truth, the gap left by its absence, is exactly what the non-being of falsehood is.

To reach the realm of truth we have to go up to the next floor, leave the level of representation, and reach the level of judgement. This level is not one of objects and representations, but is rather the realm of *knowledge*. And knowledge is not an object, it is an act: an *actus intellectus*, which, according to St Thomas, is what in the end *esse ut verum* means[30]. It is true that the representations of the rationalists do not reach this level; but neither can radicalized analytical philosophy give a sound account of truth, for all its denunciations of the failures of rationalism. It must fail so long as its theory of propositions continues within the limitations imposed by func- tionalist formalism, within which there is no room for the *act of the intellect*[31].

Thomas's *esse ut verum* is a point of contact with the "gnoseological being" of

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[27] *De Veritate*, q.1, a.3.
[28] *Metaph.*, VI, 2, 1026 a 35.
[29] *In VI Metaph.*, lect. 4, n. 1223.
[30] Cf. *Quodlibet*. XII, q.1, art. un., ad 1; *In III Sent.*, d.6, q.2, a.2; *S.Th.*, I, q.48, a.2, ad 2.
[31] Cf. TUGENDHAT, *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie*, pp. 472-495.

Kant which «is not a real predicate»[32], and also with linguistic being of analytical philosophers, which in its most characteristic sense is expressed by means of the existential quantifier[33]. In this dialogue, the philosophical superiority of Aquinas's philosophy can be seen in the fact that though he recognises the epistemological and linguistic senses of being, he has no difficulty in accepting the real being, the *esse*, of each thing. Quite the contrary: real being, *esse*, has to be there as the terminus of cognitive correspondence and, in short, as the foundation of the truth of our thought and our language.

The theory of *esse ut verum*, and its distinction from *esse proprium*, is, of course, a key point in the metaphysical realism of Aquinas. But it also shows that his philosophy is not just a venerable historical monument, but continues to be living thought, and strictly up to date.

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Abstract: Una corrente forte della filosofia contemporanea propone l'analisi linguistica come la nuova «philosophia prima». Questa proposta si basa sulle tesi che il senso principale di ens *sia* verum*, e che lo studio proprio della verità sia l'analisi formale delle proposizioni. Nella filosofia realista di Aristotele e Tommaso d'Aquino, il* verum *è un senso distinto di* ens*, senza però esserne il senso principale. La dottrina tommasiana sulla verità concorda con la filosofia analitica nel situare la verità nel giudizio. Ma per Tommaso la verità del giudizio non si può trovare, né spiegare, a livello dell'analisi formale; il giudizio vero e il giudizio falso sono ugualmente giudizi, ma non ugualmente veri. È soltanto la nozione della verità come corrispondenza con la cosa—che non è affatto una* somiglianza *alla cosa—che spiega perché la verità appartiene propriamente al giudizio. Ciò vuol dire che fare del* verum *il senso principale di* ens *è fraintendere la natura della verità stessa.*

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[32] *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 598-599, B 626-627.
[33] Cf. P. GEACH, *Aquinas*, in G.E.M. ANSCOMBRE and P. GEACH, *Three Philosophers*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1973, pp. 90-91.