But in Which Way is the Good Said? On the Homonym – Analogy of the Good in EN I, 4

Abstract

The article attempts to answer the question raised by Aristotle in NE i , 4 1096 b 26 by presenting, in a synthetic way, the meaning and scope of homonymy in Aristotle’s thought. The categorial argument deployed by Aristotle to criticize Plato’s position regarding the good is subsequently analyzed. However, that argument does not lead to affirm conclusively the real homonymy of the good, as Aristotle himself seems to admit. The fact that the good appears in diverse domains of reality does not assure its polivocity, which is a necessary condition for homonymy. Besides, the article points out the meaning of analogy with regards to the good. Next, it analyzes the argument that seems to be critical to assure the polivocity of the good and its relative homonymy, the argument in which the distinction between the good in itself and the good for the sake of another good is grounded. Thus admitted the relative homonymy of the good – without excluding its analogical relationship –, the article attempts to understand the real answer – not indicated by Aristotle – to the question regarding the way in which the good is predicated ; the answer, which is circumscribed to the practical sphere, would be that only for the virtuous person is the good a homonym reality related to a first good, happiness.