Aquinas on Answering the « Is It ? » Question about Singulars

What the ʼIsʼ Signifies in the Proposition « Socrates is »

Abstract

In this paper, I respond to the position of Lawrence Dewan and Stephen Brock that the answer to the question « Is it ? » is always made according to the sense of ‘is’ that signifies the truth of the composition of a proposition. Looking at Aquinas’s semantic theory, I argue that one exception to this rule concerns the answer to the « Is it ? » question when asked of a singular substance such as Socrates. In this case, the ‘is’ in the proposition « Socrates is » signifies the actuality of Socrates rather than the truth of the proposition. In the course of this investigation, I clarify aspects of Aquinas semantic theory as regards his views on the copula and its signification.