Ontologia formale e negazione dialettica nella prima fenomenologia di Scheler. Dalla fenomenologia alla Teoria delle Categorie
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.19272/202000701007Keywords:
Formal Ontology, Phenomenological Realism, Dialectics, Duality, Intuitionistic Negation, Paraconsistent Negation, Category TheoryAbstract
The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the research program of formal ontology developed by M. Scheler before his last 1922 theoretical shift. Scheler’s theory of dialectical negation will be also investigated. In regard to the first topic, the focus will be on the complex architecture of Scheler’s formal ontology, deepened within a theoretical framework of real ontology : integrated into this framework, formal ontology becomes a basic tool for building phenomenological realisms. In regard to the second topic, the focus will be on the close theoretical relationship between Scheler’s mature suggestion of a phenomenological objective dialectics essence-being and the formal ontological foundation of a logical theory of a pluralistic dialectical negation, that is, dually, an intuitionistic, hence paracomplete, and a paraconsistent negation. Finally, it will be introduced the basics of a semiotic interpretation of Scheler’s phenomenological formal ontology within the rigorous framework of Category Theory (TC). This interpretation strengthens the traditional (inter)subjective side of phenomenological analysis with a new – in the application suggested – in the third person objective side of semiotic analysis, that shares with the first one a common pre-logical and ante-predicative level of inquiry.