La razionalità dell’“Etica Nicomachea”
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17421/1121_2179_1994_03_01_YarzaAbstract
Aristotle distinguishes two modes of practical cognition, one universal and scientific — ethical knowledge — and the other concrete and virtuous — prudential knowledge. Ethical knowledge, owing to its claim to be prescriptive and binding, must be able to give an account of its necessity and its scientific status. The peculiar characteristics of its object, which is human praxis, as well as its practical aim, compel Aristotle to make use of the dialectical method. This is able to give coherence to his entire ethical discourse, and confers upon it a degree of necessity which is not absolute and definitive, and which therefore only time can consolidate; it will always be called upon to give proof of its validity and vigor.
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Pubblicato
01-03-1994
Come citare
Yarza, Ignacio. «La Razionalità dell’“Etica Nicomachea”». Acta Philosophica 3, no. 1 (marzo 1, 1994): 75–96. Consultato settembre 1, 2024. https://www.actaphilosophica.it/article/view/4289.
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Sezione
Studi